to the value of the scientific mode of inquiry as one of the highes achievements of the Enlightenment.3
By chronicling the great "civilizing mission" of the "exact" scien seeks to challenge the contextualist and relativist programs of social sociologists. He believes that if the dominant historical movement of teenth century and early twentieth century, namely "savage and ubi rialism, can be shown to have had no influence on the physical and sciences he studies, then those programs are worthless. From a number o ies-an approach he decries when it is adopted by others-Pyenson p confirm his doubts.4 He finds, first, that the practices in these "exact" no evidence of any "transmutation" produced by imperialism; and sec the "exact" sciences had any significant social and political impact colonial dependencies, and this precisely because they were so patent imperialist taint.
These bold claims, if they were as substantial as Pyenson wishes, would a significant attack on some major achievements in the history of sc decades: the realization of the value of social historical and sociologi for understanding the development of science, and the increasing acc history of science as part of the broader discipline of history. History o no longer only about the great and the good and their "contributions" to of what Pyenson regards as peculiarly Western forms of knowledge. It is now also about institutions supporting scientific work and about the place of science in changing social and economic structures and relations. It is also about how this social context in turn can influence the formation and validation of scientific knowledge.5
Besides being particularly fruitful methodologically, the examination of these issues has led historians of science to explore new areas like the relationship between science and imperialism, and this has expanded and enriched our community of practitioners.6 As the development and place of science in the world outside of Europe and North America receive more attention, many more historians from Africa, Asia, 3 Lewis Pyenson, "What Is the Good of History of Science?" History of Science, 1989, 27:353-389, on p. 353; and "Why Science," p. 70 and South America are encouraged to pay greater attention to scien many ways, has led this expansion of our intellectual horizons and h and considerable reputation among the emerging group of historia the third world and those with an interest in the history of third wor we think that Pyenson is offering them a model that will bring a return defined history of European achievements and that will simply continu the history of, for example, Indonesia and Algeria to that of the W on a very narrow range of theoretical resources and is presented with a will do nothing to make history of science more attractive to new scho program is therefore both intellectually impoverished and politicall deserves close scrutiny. In this essay we first discuss Pyenson's fundamental distinction be act" and "descriptive" sciences. After this we turn to the question imperialism built into his argument, and then discuss the problema model of diffusion that underpins it. Finally, we consider the relati science and political power. In the conclusion we offer what we f open, ecumenical, and exciting historical agenda for the study of s perialism.
THE "EXACT" SCIENCES
A great number of historians of science may appreciate Pyenson's o to highlight the special significance of the scientific mode of inqui opment of contemporary civilization, a concern that is shared e Pyenson would probably want to dismiss as relativists.7 Howeve ulates against the contextualist and relativist program for the histo from convincing.
Pyenson's argument about the place of physics and astronomy sion and the accompanying claims about the inadequacies of soc sociologists' appreciations of the history of science rest on the trad unquestioned) division of the sciences into "exact" and "descri cisely, Pyenson believes that as long as scientists are simply collect is no disciplinary consensus as to how these data should be ass meaning, it is to be expected that they should be ordered quite diffe groups and that preference for one or another ordering may be in logical-"external"-considerations. That a body of scientific primitive "descriptive," 'inductive," or "qualitative" stage of lif with such unscientific baggage is for Pyenson totally unsurprisi view this baggage is displaced from scientific discourse as the e comes more complete and the theoretical framework in which it fi and mathematically precise or "exact."9 Pyenson goes on to argue therefore th studies showing how imperialism affected the development of any scienc than the "exact" ones cannot be used to support any general claims about t nature of scientific knowledge. A meaningful claim can emerge only from of the impact of "external" factors on the "exact" sciences. In fact, the o claim that meets with Pyenson's qualified approval is Paul Forman's attempt to the birth of the "new physics" to peculiarities of German "culture" during the twentieth century. There are, of course, many other interesting and convincin ies that could be cited, and their number is ever increasing.10
Pyenson's argument clearly echoes the historiographical discussions that the publication of Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Tod ever, growing numbers of historians of science view the distinctions betw ternal" and "external" factors, and between "exact" and "descriptive" scien were so crucial in the 1960s as specific to debates at that time and now superse Pyenson wishes to swim against this current.
Pyenson's case is based, first, on a misrepresentation of the contextualist an ativist program. He argues that if the general claims of this approach wer then one should be able to detect, for example, the "clear presence of im ideology and practice in publications of physics and astronomy which are in imperialist settings." He claims, however, that physics and astronomy variant across the political, economic, and social gap separating the imp tropolis and its colonial periphery. Whether this is a valid empirical fin moot point, as Pyenson starts from the presumption that "because discour exact sciences is insular, activity in physics, astronomy and mathematics is esp suited as a cultural probe."12 But the whole point of the contextualist and program is to take nothing about science as given or timeless. The aim ins explore how boundaries between scientific and social considerations arose changed historically. For example, no distinctions were made between the of politics and that of science in early seventeenth-century England, but n are very different. when one of these theories of knowledge becomes dominant, the cont relativist program seeks to explain how social processes and social forc that outcome. Thus, moving to another country, we find that in late and early eighteenth-century France a body of professional scholars en royal patronage because by building a theoretical system that unified all n nomena through the mathematical language of Newtonian mechanics they theological legitimacy to the efforts of the monarchy to undermine all in centers of political power. Here the "exact" sciences played an explicit role.14 A century and a half later the position of the French state was qui but the intellectual orientations and the social organization of the "re ence" established earlier were too strongly entrenched to be reformed state: the scientists charged with the task of reform were so imbued with of this republic that they could not envision any alternative organization. prisingly, the nineteenth-century "exact" sciences seem to some historian to have been immune to social influences. But most social historians an of science would remember that this relative immunity of physicists and to political pressure, a major theme in Pyenson's studies of the "exact" sciences in Algiers, Batavia, and Shanghai, was the consequence of intellectual orientations and institutional positions established through social negotiations under historical circumstances that no longer obtained in late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century society. Colonial physicists' and astronomers' relative immunity to the mundane politics of the Age of Empire may simply have been a reflection of the social and political position of metropolitan physics and astronomy; that immunity does not stand as evidence against the social history or sociology of science.16
With regard to the second linchpin of Pyenson's argument, the distinction between the "exact" and "descriptive" sciences, no one has yet defined the rites of passage from one to the other. Indeed, most historians seem to have followed Kuhn in regarding the distinction as specific to nineteenth-century physics, and perhaps inappropriate for other sciences at other times.17 Furthermore, that all forms of scientific discourse should have in fact aimed, and may still aim, toward a mathematically exact discourse provides no strong evidence against the historicist and sociological position. On the contrary, it has been argued that this tendency was socially deter-mined, and that the very language of logic and mathematics that und onomy of the sciences can be shown to be socially constituted.'8 It seems to us that the boundaries between "internal" and "external" factors and taxonomies of scientific disciplines should not be taken as timeless, fixed concept but should themselves become objects of inquiry. Why these objects should be d fined and institutionalized quite differently by different communities of scientists i different social situations and in different periods of history is an exciting historica question that, we believe, can be understood only by means of the sociological o servations so despised by Pyenson. In fact, social historians and sociologists of sc ence have already put these analytical tools to work, in the very ways Pyenson r ommends, in order to understand the place of science in modern "civilization."'9 ON THE NATURE OF IMPERIALISM That Pyenson's characterization of the different sciences is inadeq case against contextualists is only one of the problems besetti the relationship between science and imperialism. Pyenson has comparative study that imperialism comes in different forms sometimes economic, or political, or social, or scientific-and that i combinations of any of these.20 No single meaning can be atta However, interest in diversity is for Pyenson more a matter o toriographical practice: apart from this single broad comparat cused exclusively on "cultural imperialism" and on the "civilizing mission." He fails to explicate these terms, and others that are usually associated with imperialism, such as exploitation and domination, find no place in his history. There is no recognition of the links between military, economic, or technological dominance and cultural hegemony; the "higher" motives of the "civilizing mission" are treated as quite different from "baser" economic, political, military, and social ones. That the "civilizing mission" was in fact often experienced in the same way as these other forms of domination is also consistently ignored.2' More significantly, in the Age of Empire the relationships between colonial policy and science, as Pyenson himself recognizes, were far from uniform across imperial boundaries. Not all colonies were the same, and neither were the scientific efforts in them. There were great differences between the German physical and astronomical endeavors in tiny Samoa and the large British scientific enterprise in the Indian subcontinent or developments in a country like Australia. Pyenson's focus on the "exact" sciences and "cultural imperialism" in places like Samoa means that he is study-ing an extremely small aspect of imperial science, as measured in t institutions, spending, or publications. This is an extremely un from which to offer a model of imperial strategies in science or m science and imperialism.22 Most of the science practiced in and for was intended to support and service economic and political objectiv French, German, and other imperial powers established large scient departments in the colonies, and most had major metropolitan to research on colonial problems and the training of colonial scient India, for example, there were universities, research institutes, nical services, and voluntary scientific organizations. Interestin icy in the early part of the nineteenth century concentrated on th education of Indian elites, and science was not a chosen vehicle mission." Scientific and technical education was introduced there la and then only to prepare technicians to assist their British ma immediate economic value-surveying, botany, medicine, and
The biological, environmental, and medical sciences, in the elsewhere, were the main ones deployed in the effort to harnes perial wagon because they were the most useful (as were those bran physical, and astronomical research relevant to meteorology an the first, and until 1900 the most important, imperial scientific in botanical gardens. They were set up to facilitate the collection tivation of economically valuable plants; later, often as the rese ricultural departments, they housed research on plant genetics, pa iology, not to mention entomology. In medicine, the concern to co as malaria and other tropical fevers, which acted as impedimen and development of certain areas, led to research initiatives an new etiological models of disease. In every case the imperial co the instigation of research, provided the resources used to sol shaped the form of the knowledge produced.25 When it came to pr health in the colonies, colonial scientists and administrators oft and vectors more convenient to work with than the indigenous po between strategies, and their supporting research programs, k and notes that indigenes "occasionally did see abstract knowledge as part of their oppressor's baggage." But in this particular case the observatory was not just seen as part of the baggage. Rather, it was the very agency that produced maps of the region for the French forces and enabled them to subdue and govern a subject people.27
The reason more observatories were not attacked is that there were so few of them.
At the time of Ghanaian independence colonial agricultural science was criticized for failing to deal with a disease affecting the important cocoa crop in any manner satisfactory to the local farmers. The whole subject became highly politicized and resulted in attempts to create an alternative science that would solve the problem in ways that were not detrimental to the producers.28 The modem historical researcher may be able to make fine distinctions about the nature of work in a particular institution and its functional neutrality, but historically, and from the perspective of a subject people, military, political, commercial, and scientific colonial personnel were all potential agents of domination.29 This indigenous perspective is nowhere found in Pyenson's work; all he cares for is the work of scientific missionaries exporting metropolitan civilization to the colonial periphery.
Pyenson claims to show that unlike work in the "descriptive" bio ronmental sciences, the endeavors in physics and astronomy that
were not segregated into products of intellectual metropoles and perip lieves that the work of physicists and astronomers in the colonia French, German, and Dutch empires spoke to a spirit that transce human conditions of life," a spirit that lifted them above the mu besetting their social environment. The work was therefore valued eq of their colleagues in Paris, Berlin, or Amsterdam, and they were members of a single, universal citadel of exact sciences. 30 Pyenson cla to this solidarity, research institutes and educational establishments f astronomers in imperial outposts acted as constant and indelible r unity of the colonial periphery and its ties to the diverse imperial me We agree that to discuss the relationship between, for example, phy
and London in terms of the now-outmoded concept of metropolita nial peripheries is fruitless.3' This is one of the reasons to appreciate However, his conclusion that the site of production is therefore irrel ranted. There is little support for it in the example of physics in oretical studies dominated experimental ones for pragmatic reaso sumption of an extraordinary degree of agreement between phys London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Washington, and Tokyo is also questionable. Current work in the history of modern physics shows a great deal of cognitive dissonance-dissonance that may be the product of different cultural traditions-even between metropolitan centers.32 More significantly, Pyenson denies the value of the "core and periphery" model for explaining the development of the "exact" sciences, yet relies on it in a more general and crucial way: he sees only a one-way traffic of culture and civility from imperial metropolis to colonial periphery. This approach is contrary to the modern understanding of imperialism, which considers the interactions between metropoles and peripheries and sees an active role for the cultures of subject populations.33 If we look at the colonies through these different eyes, we see that Western methods and knowledge were not accepted passively, but were adapted and selectively absorbed in relation to existing traditions of natural knowledge and religion and other factors. For example, Indian researchers produced scientific knowledge highly valued in the metropolis which was influenced by indigenous, Indian traditions of natural knowledge. They did not need to be civilized, and often they resented the assumption that India needed "civilizing." This sentiment fed Indian nationalism and undermined imperial unity; scientific meetings in the 1930s were an imp for the discussion and advancement of Indian independence. In this conte also note European scientists practicing in India, such as Robert Mc Albert Howard, whose researches were creatively shaped by the indigeno If we turn our attention toward the metropolis, we see that imperi fected the development of metropolitan scientific institutions and k importance of empire to the development of the biological sciences to specific disciplines like entomology is clear. As Michael Osborne h cently, the same can be said for mid-nineteenth-century Parisian m Other studies have demonstrated the influence of imperialism on the ences. In geology, Robert Stafford has shown the importance of empire and ideas of Roderick Murchison and mid-Victorian geology in gen Smith and M. Norton Wise have argued that the fundamental contrib liam Thomson and other British physicists and engineers to the developm trodynamics were profoundly influenced by both utilitarian and imp ations. 35 In sum, we should take seriously Roy MacLeod's views on t of the core-periphery model; his preferred view is captured by the phra ing metropolis," which highlights the importance of seeing scientif changing, variable, and polycentric. We should also follow the advi Reingold and Marc Rothenberg, who, after reviewing a number of studie science, proposed that "to understand science fully requires an understan ecology of its environment."36 THE SCIENCES AND POLITICAL POWER One last problem raised by Pyenson's thesis is how to evaluate the relationship between different sciences and political power. As we have seen, Pyenson bases his views on this matter on the following reasoning. Physics and astronomy were, and always will be, immune to ideological bias by reason of their advanced state of intellectual development (not to mention their supposed worthlessness in the eyes of government officials seeking to make science serve imperialism). By virtue of this immunity to political contamination, these sciences were able to play a far more powerful and lasting imperial role than the biological and environmental sciences ever did. What is the evidence for this conclusion? Presumably, to answer this question one would need to know how to judge the effectiveness of the various links between the different forms of imperialism and the various sciences. Pyenson provides no criteria to guide us here, only an unelaborated notion of the "civilizing mission." While sometimes recognizing that the relationships between imperialism and science were quite varied in different imperial contexts, Pyenson mostly ignores the possibility that the different links may be due to culturally and hi cific attitudes toward the proper place of science in society. Except in o matic paper, he simply glides over the possibility that the differen science and scientists (not to mention the different justifications for s ence articulated in London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Washington, sulted in different links between science and the imperial vision being the various metropoles, regardless of the disciplines involved. Ins champions the view of science embedded in the rhetoric of science prevailed in late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century Germany particular), a view that was strongly influenced by idealism and the tance attached to mathematical studies for the pursuit of "truth." Euge recent work on late nineteenth-century German botanists' research Asia, which were largely supported by the Berlin Academy of Sci however that the "descriptive" and scarcely mathematical endeavors nists could serve to advance the cause of imperialism just as well as colleagues in the "exact" sciences.37 Much of Pyenson's work is ther peculiar place of certain sciences in German society and its implications imperial expansion. Such work highlights only one among many po science in such expansion.
Since, as is suggested by Pyenson, much of the literature on scie rialism has focused on the experience of the British Empire, a brief look at the cultural specificities of British science and their implications for the use of science to advance imperial goals will confirm the difficulties of Pyenson's model. There is no evidence that physics or astronomy played any significant role in British imperial policy or colonial rule. In the British Empire influence (political power is too strong a term) went to those scientists and sciences whose activities served or promised to serve the direct economic and political goals of imperialism. It was such linkages that enabled major institutions like the Geological Survey of India, the schools of tropical medicine in Liverpool and London, and the discipline of social anthropology to grow.38 In the 1920s the British scientific elite did participate in discussions about the emerging concept of Commonwealth, though it was the scientific community as a whole rather than any particular discipline that was used as a model for imperial federation. However, the main thrust of British imperial policy after 1918 was to create research and technical assistance agencies in individual territories where they could be guided by and best serve local economic and political interests. the pursuit of the more esoteric goals of any physicists and astrono from this perspective, the relationship between the different science "descriptive," and the politics of imperial control appears refractory explanation.
CONCLUSION
The histories of the different sciences in the race to build empires duri teenth and early twentieth centuries were undoubtedly very different. differences were not necessarily products of the greater or lesser "exact ferent disciplinary discourses. The contribution expected of the differen in expanding imperial control during the Age of Empire was contingent metropolitan cultural and social traditions and on divergent imperi structures. The impact of science in the colonial and postcolonial history ferent indigenous societies was in turn a product of the encounters of i metropolitan cultures, encounters that are totally absent from Pyen what empire meant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries In place of the limited view offered by Pyenson, we want to offer terested in the relationship between science and imperial domination is much wider and more rewarding. First, however, we want to emp most of humanity, the history of science and imperialism is the history Seen from this perspective, the whole subject takes on a far greater is through the growing number of historians of science from third wor colonial countries that the subject will be developed. Science and imp too important to be regarded only as a test bed for the power of Wester or the defense of arcane historiographical distinctions. Second, we w that the distinction between "exact" and "descriptive" sciences be aba context as it has been elsewhere and that historians study those sciences enterprises that were most important for imperial power. Attention focused on the development of regional and national scientific comm the reasons for their different places in international science. In th comments we have indicated how the history of science can be plac the political, economic, and social history of both the imperial powers a nial possessions. This shift is important because to understand the in tween science and empire we must pay greater attention to the historica heritage of both the imperialists and the indigenes, and to how the latte acted with and then reshaped various forms of knowledge. Our own will be enriched because our scientific heritage was not unaffected b To follow Pyenson and do otherwise is to perpetuate in a very unw justified manner the submission of the history of former colonial p eties to that of the West.
